QUICK OVERVIEW AND LINKS TO THE OTHER THEMES AND CHAPTERS IN THE BOOK
The first major content theme in The Atlas of Social Complexity is Cognition, Emotion and Consciousness. This first theme includes six chapters, which I have so far blogged on. Chapter 6 addresses autopoiesis. Chapter 7 turns to the role of bacteria in human consciousness. Chapter 8 explores how the immune system, just like bacteria and cells, is cognitive – and the implications this has for our wider brain-based consciousness. Chapter 9 explores a complexity framing of brain-based cognition, emotion and consciousness. Chapter 10 explores the complex multilevel dynamics of the Self. Chapter 11 is about human-machine intelligence.
The second major content theme in The Atlas of Social Complexity is The Dynamics of Human Psychology. So far for this theme, I’ve given a basic overview, found here. I then moved on to the first theme, Human psychology as dynamical system (Chapter 13). From there I reviewed Chapter 14: Psychopathology of mental disorders ; Chapter 15: Healing and the therapeutic process; and Chapter 16: Mindfulness, imagination, and creativity.
The third major theme is living in social systems (Chapter 17). The first chapter in this section is Complex social psychology (Chapter 18). From there we move on to Collective behaviour, social movements and mass psychology (Chapter 19). Next is Configurational Social Science (Chapter 20). From there we move to the Complexities of Place (Chapter 21); followed by Socio-technical Life (Chapter 22). Chapter 23 turned to the theme of Governance, Politics and Technocracy. Chapter 24 focused on The Challenges of Applying Complexity. Chapter 25 focused on Economics in an unstable world. And, finally, Chapter 26 focused on resilience and all that jazz. Chapter 27 introduces the final theme of the book, Methods and complex causality. It begins with Chapter 28, Make Love, Not Models and then moves on to Chapter 29, Revisiting Complex Causality. Chapter 30 maps the new methodological terrain.
The focus of the current blog post is (Chapter 31) is addressing the issue of philosophical complexity and outlining our approach, complex realism.
Getting Philosophically Real
When Lasse and I set out to map the complexity turn in social science, we knew the tour couldn’t end without turning to philosophy. Not the capital-P, armchair sort that polishes metaphysical trinkets. We mean philosophy as groundwork, as excavation, as a toolkit for getting real about complexity. Hence, the final chapter of The Atlas of Social Complexity is our invitation to “get philosophically real.”
It all began with a provocation: I (Brian) was in South Africa, running a workshop on our complexity-friendly methods at Nelson Mandela University. We hit the first condition—“There is no philosophy of complexity”—and the room, filled with philosophers, went still. Then came the hands. “What about Cilliers?” “What about Varela?” “What about Prigogine and Stengers?” The conversation erupted. It was brilliant. And telling.
What we realized in that moment, and what this chapter tries to spell out, is that the philosophy of complexity exists—but only in fragments. Spread across systems theory, postmodern critiques, cybernetics, epistemologies of embodiment, and methodological pluralism, it lacks a clear terrain. It’s like the early days of the social science turn in complexity: present, provocative, but disjointed. Hence our call for a philosophy of complexity—not just a complexity of philosophy. A grounded, ongoing engagement between philosophers and complexity scientists. A framing. A field.
To that end, this chapter sketches a philosophical programme that we and others have come to call complex realism. Rooted in Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism and branching through thinkers like Archer, Sayer, Byrne, Elder-Vass, Harvey, and Williams, complex realism is not yet a fixed canon—it’s a post-disciplinary scaffolding. It’s a start. A field in motion.
In contrast to the narrow empiricism of much computational complexity science, complex realism foregrounds the ontological status of the social: its depth, its historicity, its emergent and stratified nature. It affirms that social systems are real—but not in the deterministic sense of physics. They are open, contingent, probabilistic. In other words, they are complex.
Importantly, complex realism is as much epistemology as it is ontology. It invites us to study social systems using a pluralist, adaptive, model-rich approach. Every model is a window, not a mirror. Causality is plural. Methods must be mixed. And emergence is not just a pattern to be visualised but an ontological feature to be reckoned with.
We are not philosophers, Lasse and I. We are social scientists. But we know that our tour cannot end in methodological pragmatism alone. We need to get clear—ontologically and epistemologically—about what we are doing. And so, we offer the following tenets of complex realism as both provocation and provisional map. Use them. Expand them. Critique them. But most of all, let’s get philosophically real—together.
Complex Realism: Basic Tenets
Ontology
- The question Bhaskar sought to answer was fundamentally ontological. He wanted to know what the social world must be like for social science to take place.
- Complex realism begins with the premise that there is a real world out there beyond what we can observe.
- The social world is just as real as the physical and natural worlds.
- Although the social world is real, it is different from the natural and physical worlds. To begin, it lacks the type of natural necessity one finds in physical and natural systems, which tend to be more deterministic. In social systems, there is also a greater degree of variance and contingency. This stems from human agency and its ability to respond differently in similar situations. It makes social reality probabilistic, with the possibilities of equifinality and multifinality, and limitations to prediction.
- Williams summarises the ontology of social complexity as follows: “social reality at any given time is the produce of the historical realisation of a matrix of contingent outcomes that have the properties of relative invariance, emergence and dynamic change”.
- Byrne and Callaghan add to this, arguing that, in terms of what social reality looks like, the social world is ontologically complex and systemic.
- Defining the bounded nature of any particular social system is a theoretical and empirical act. The systemic nature of the social world, ontologically speaking, is better seen as a complex web that is network-like in its structure and organisation.
- The networked aspects interact and it is through this interaction that environmental influences become internalized. The process by which this happens is emergence: structure is formed through the interaction of the aspects.
- As a result, social complexity is emergent, constituting its own form of reality. Emergence is an ontological necessity of social reality.
- Social existence takes place at different levels of emergent order. ‘Levels’ refers to Archer’s distinction between interactional and local to systemic, not to the conventional distinction between the micro and macro in the sense of small to large.
- Emergence is not a discrete entity or phenomenon that can be investigated as if it is an object out there. Instead, it serves as an ontological vehicle for thinking about the nature of causation.
- As an emergent reality, social complexity is ontologically defined as real, actual and empirical. The experience of social complexity is the empirical; the outcomes across instances are the actual; and the underlying mechanisms of social complexity are the real.
- Given its emergent nature, social complexity is developmentally open, which limits the possibility of prediction.
Epistemology
- Given its ontological position, complex realism in the hands of social scientists is focused on the empirical study of the actualized real. The question is under what conditions the real becomes actualized.
- This is the search for (conditional) empirical mechanisms – which is why critical realism and configurational thinking, in our estimate, fit together so well.
- When complex realists use the term ‘social complexity theory’ they mean a framework for understanding social life as emergent from the real to the actual.
- As a framework, social complexity theory can be both conceptual and offer a causal theory.
- Social complexity theory also provides a theory of production: an explanation of e.g., how power is produced, or how social deprivation comes into being.
- Given the complex nature of social reality, epistemologically speaking, we can never fully know social complexity to its full actualized extent. It means that any given empirical model is not entirely correct. They are windows unto the social complexity being studied.
- Still, while bounded, we can know things about social systems and their complex causality.
- Because all models will be under-determined (or, perhaps more appropriate to complexity, over-determined) by the evidence, we need multiple complementary empirical models.
- Given the need to develop multiple models, be it from different angles and theoretical framings, methodologies and methods likewise need to be pluralistic and transdisciplinary.
Next stop? A phase shift. The future of complexity science needs its philosophy—not as ornament but as infrastructure.